标记档案: 塞尔

人是中国房

在本系列前面的帖子, 我们讨论了塞尔的中国房说法怎么是毁灭性的前提下,我们的大脑是数字计算机. 他认为, 非常令人信服, 这仅仅是象征手法不会导致富的理解,我们似乎很喜欢. 然而, 我拒绝被说服, ,发现所谓的系统响应更有说服力. 这是反驳说,这是整个中国间的理解的语言, 不只是在室内的操作员或符号推杆. 塞尔一笑置之, 但有一个严重的反应,以及. 他说,, “让我成为整个中国房. 让我记住所有的符号和符号操作规则,这样我可以为中国对问题的回复. 我还是不明白中国人“。

现在, 这就提出了一个有趣的问题 - 如果你知道够中国符号, 和中国的规则来处理它们, 你不知道,其实中国? 当然,你可以想像一个人能够正确地处理的语言不理解一个字, 但我认为这是拉伸想象力有点过头了. 我想起的 视线盲区 实验中,人们可以看到不知道它, 而不自觉地意识到那是什么,他们看到的. 在同一方向塞尔的反应点 - 能说中国话不理解它. 什么是中国房缺乏的是它是什么做的自觉意识.

钻研深一点进入这场辩论, 我们必须变得有点正式的关于语法和语义. 语言有两种语法和语义. 例如, 像“请读我的博客文章”声明的语法是从英语的语法始​​发, 这是文字符号 (占位符语法), 字母和标点符号. 在所有的语法的顶端, 它有一个内容 - 我的愿望,并要求您阅读我的文章, 和我的背景相信你知道什么符号和内容的意思. 即语义, 该语句的含义.

计算机, 据塞尔, 只能处理符号和, 基于符号运算, 拿出语法正确的回应. 它不理解语义内容,因为我们做. 这是无能的,因为它缺乏理解我的要求的遵守. 正是在这个意义上,中国房并不了解中国. 至少, 这是塞尔的说法. 由于计算机是喜欢中国房, 他们无法理解或者语义. 但是,我们的大脑可以, 因此,大脑不能仅仅计算机.

当把这种方式, 我想大多数人会一边与塞尔. 但是,如果计算机可能实际上符合构成语句的语义内容的请求和命令什么? 我想即使是这样,我们可能不会考虑一台电脑完全可以胜任的语义理解, 这就是为什么如果一台计算机实际上符合我的要求看我的帖子, 我可能不会发现它智力满意. 我们正在要求什么, 当然, 是意识. 还有什么我们可以问一个电脑来说服我们,这是有意识的?

我没有一个很好的答案. 但我认为你必须申请统一的标准意识归咎于外部给你的实体 - 如果你相信他心在人类的存在, 你要问自己,你在申请到达这个结论的标准是什么, 并确保你采用同样的标准,以计算机以及. 你不能建立周期性的条件进入你的标准 - 像别人一样有人体, 神经系统和像你这样做了,他们有思想,以及剖析, 这就是塞尔做.

在我看来, 最好是保持开放的头脑这样的问题, 而重要的是不要从逻辑不足的位置作答.

心中的机器智能

教授. 塞尔也许是最有名的,他证明了计算机 (或计算由阿兰·图灵定义) 永远不能智能. 他的证明采用的是所谓的中国房参数, 这表明,仅仅象征手法 (这就是计算车削的定义是, 据塞尔) 不能导致理解和情报. ERGO我们的大脑和思想不可能是单纯的电脑.

这个论点是这样的 - 假设塞尔被关在一个房间里,他得到相应的问题在中国的投入. 他有一组规则来处理所述输入符号并挑选出一个输出符号, 就像一台计算机做. 于是,他想出了这种欺骗外界法官相信,他们与一个真正的中国扬声器中国通信响应. 假定这是可以做到. 现在, 这里是妙语 - 塞尔不知道中国人的字. 他不知道是什么意思的符号. 所以仅仅基于规则的符号操纵是不足以保证情报, 意识, 理解等. 通过图灵测试是不够的,保证情报.

一个反arguements,我发现最有趣的是塞尔调用系统参数. 它不是塞尔在中国的房间,了解中国; 它是整个系统,包括一个执行规则集. 塞尔笑而过说, “什么, 该 了解中国?!“我认为,系统参数值得更多的是嘲笑解雇. 我有两个支持论据支持的系统响应.

第一个是我在本系列取得了以前的帖子点. 在 他心知问题, 我们看到,塞尔的回答这个问题别人是否有思想基本上是由行为和类比. 其他表现得好像他们的头脑 (在他们哭出来的时候,我们打他们的拇指用锤子) 和疼痛内部机制 (神经, 大脑, 神经元生火等) 类似于我们. 在中国的房间的情况下, 可以肯定的行为就像先了解中国, 但它不具有任何类似物中的部件的术语或机制像中国扬声器. 难道这种突破类似于被阻止塞尔从智能分配给它, 尽管它的智能行为?

第二个参数以另一种思想实验的形式 - 我认为它被称为中国民族参数. 比方说,我们可以在每个神经元的塞尔大脑的工作委托给非英语的人. 所以,当塞尔听到英文的问题, 它实际上是由非英语讲万亿计算单元处理, 它生成相同的响应,他的大脑会. 现在, 其中,在非英语的中国这个国家的英语理解母语的人作为神经元? 我认为一个人不得不说,这是整个“国家”是懂英语. 或将塞尔一笑置之说, “什么, 该 民族 懂英语?!“

好, 如果中国的民族能听懂英语, 我猜想中国机房可以了解中国以及. 计算与单纯的符号操纵 (这是什么人在全国正在做) 可以,而且确实导致智力和理解. 所以,我们的大脑可能真的是电脑, 和思想的软件操纵符号. ERGO塞尔是错误的.

看, 我用教授. 塞尔的论据和我在这个系列作为戏剧效果排序对话框反驳. 事情的事实是, 教授. 塞尔是一个世界知名的哲学家与令人印象深刻的凭据,而我是一个偶发性的博客 - 一个驱动器由哲学家充其量. 我想我在这里道歉,以教授. 塞尔和他的学生,如果他们发现我的帖子和评论进攻. 它的目的不是; 只是一个有趣的阅读之意.

他心知问题

你怎么知道其他人有思想,你做? 这听起来像一个愚蠢的问题, 但如果你让自己去想, 你会发现,你有没有合乎逻辑的理由去相信他心的存在, 这就是为什么它是哲学的尚未解决的问题 – 他心知问题. 为了说明 – 我工作的宜家项目日前, 并锤打在怪异的双头钉螺丝存根的thingie. 我彻底错过了,打我的拇指. 我感到难以忍受的疼痛, 意思是我心目中觉得它和我哭了. 我知道我有一个主意,因为我感觉到了痛. 现在, 比方说,我看到另外一个笨蛋击中他的拇指和哭出来. 我觉得不痛; 我心里觉得没什么 (除了上好的日子有点同情的). 有什么积极的逻辑基础我不得不思考的问题 (哭) 是造成疼痛的感觉由记?

你要知道, 我不是说其他​​人没有思想或意识 - 没有, 至少. 我只是指出,没有逻辑基础,相信他们做的. 逻辑肯定不是信仰的唯一依据. 信仰是另一. 直觉, 打个比方, 妄想, 灌输, 同侪压力, 本能等. 都是基础的信仰真假. 我相信其他人的头脑; 否则,我不会理会这些写博客文章. 但我很清楚,我对这个特殊的信念,没有逻辑的理由.

关于其他的头脑这个问题的事情是,它是深刻的不对称. 如果我相信你没有一个头脑, 这不是你的问题 - 你知道,我错了的时候,你听到它,因为你知道你的心思都有了 (假设, 当然, 你做). 但我有一个严重的问题 - 有没有办法让我攻击我的信念,在不存在你的脑海. 你能告诉我, 当然, 但后来我想, “是啊, 这正是一只没大脑的机器人将被编程的说!“

我是听一系列的讲座心中所教授的哲学. 约翰·塞尔. 他“解决”等思想类推的问题. 我们知道,我们有相同的解剖和neurophysical布线除了类似行为. 因此,我们可以“说服”自己,我们每个人都有心中. 这是一个很好的理由,只要它进入. 让我困扰的约是它的补充 - 它意味着什么有关布线不同的方式在头脑中的东西, 像蛇和蜥蜴,鱼类和蛞蝓和蚂蚁和细菌和病毒. 和, 当然, 机.

可能机器有思想? 这个问题的答案是相当微不足道的 - 当然,他们可以. 我们是生物机, 而我们的头脑 (假设, 再, 那你们做). 请问电脑有思想? 或, 更尖锐, 可能我们的大脑是计算机, 意念就可以了软件运行? 也就是说饲料的下一篇文章.

Dualism

After being called one of the 顶 50 philosophy bloggers, I feel almost obliged to write another post on philosophy. This might vex Jat who, while appreciating the post on my first car, was somewhat less than enthusiastic about my deeper thoughts. Also looking askance at my philosophical endeavors would be a badminton buddy of mine who complained that my posts on death scared the bejesus out of him. 但, 我能说什么, I have been listening to a lot of philosophy. I listened to the lectures by Shelly Kagan on just that dreaded topic of death, and by John Searle (再) on the philosophy of mind.

Listening to these lectures filled me with another kind of dread. I realized once again how ignorant I am, and how much there is to know, think and figure out, and how little time is left to do all that. Perhaps this recognition of my ignorance is a sign of growing wisdom, if we can believe Socrates. At least I hope it is.

One thing I had some misconceptions about (or an incomplete understanding of) was this concept of dualism. Growing up in India, I heard a lot about our monistic philosophy called 不二. The word means not-two, and I understood it as the rejection of the Brahman and Maya distinction. 为了用一个例子来说明吧, say you sense something — like you see these words in front of you on your computer screen. Are these words and the computer screen out there really? If I were to somehow generate the neuronal firing patterns that create this sensation in you, you would see these words even if they were not there. This is easy to understand; 毕竟, this is the main thesis of the movie Matrix. So what you see is merely a construct in your brain; it is Maya or part of the Matrix. What is causing the sensory inputs is presumably Brahman. 所以, to me, Advaita meant trusting only the realness of Brahman while rejecting Maya. 现在, after reading a bit more, I’m not sure that was an accurate description at all. Perhaps that is why Ranga criticized me long time ago.

In Western philosophy, there is a different and more obvious kind of dualism. It is the age-old mind-matter distinction. What is mind made of? Most of us think of mind (those who think of it, 就是说) as a computer program running on our brain. 换句话说, mind is software, brain is hardware. They are two different kinds of things. 毕竟, we pay separately for hardware (Dell) and software (Microsoft). Since we think of them as two, ours is an inherently dualistic view. Before the time of computers, Descartes thought of this problem and said there was a mental substance and a physical substance. So this view is called Cartesian Dualism. (顺便说说, Cartesian coordinates in analytic geometry came from Descartes as well — a fact that might enhance our respect for him.) It is a view that has vast ramifications in all branches of philosophy, from metaphysics to theology. It leads to the concepts of spirit and souls, 神, afterlife, reincarnation etc., with their inescapable implications on morality.

There are philosophers who reject this notion of Cartesian dualism. John Searle is one of them. They embrace a view that mind is an emergent property of the brain. An emergent property (more fancily called an epiphenomenon) is something that happens incidentally along with the main phenomenon, but is neither the cause nor the effect of it. An emergent property in physics that we are familiar with is temperature, which is a measure of the average velocity of a bunch of molecules. You cannot define temperature unless you have a statistically significant collection of molecules. Searle uses the wetness of water as his example to illustrate emergence of properties. You cannot have a wet water molecule or a dry one, but when you put a lot of water molecules together you get wetness. 同样, mind emerges from the physical substance of the brain through physical processes. So all the properties that we ascribe to mind are to be explained away as physical interactions. There is only one kind of substance, which is physical. So this monistic philosophy is called physicalism. Physicalism is part of materialism (not to be confused with its current meaning — what we mean by a material girl, 例如).

You know, 该 trouble with philosophy is that there are so many isms that you lose track of what is going on in this wild jungle of jargonism. If I coined the word unrealism to go with my blog and promoted it as a branch of philosophy, or better yet, a Singaporean school of thought, I’m sure I can make it stick. Or perhaps it is already an accepted domain?

All kidding aside, the view that everything on the mental side of life, such as consciousness, thoughts, ideals etc., is a manifestation of physical interactions (I’m restating the definition of physicalism here, as you can see) enjoys certain currency among contemporary philosophers. Both Kagan and Searle readily accept this view, 例如. But this view is in conflict with what the ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle thought. They all believed in some form of continued existence of a mental substance, be it the soul, spirit or whatever. All major religions have some variant of this dualism embedded in their beliefs. (I think Plato’s dualism is of a different kind — a real, imperfect world where we live on the one hand, and an ideal perfect world of forms on the other where the souls and Gods live. More on that later.) 毕竟, God has to be made up of a spiritual “substance” other than a pure physical substance. Or how could he not be subject to the physical laws that we, mere mortals, can comprehend?

Nothing in philosophy is totally disconnected from one another. A fundamental stance such as dualism or monism that you take in dealing with the questions on consciousness, cognition and mind has ramifications in what kind of life you lead (Ethics), how you define reality (Metaphysics), 如何 you know these things (Epistemology). Through its influence on religions, it may even impact our political power struggles of our troubled times. If you think about it long enough, you can connect the dualist/monist distinction even to aesthetics. 毕竟, Richard Pirsig did just that in his 禅与摩托车维修艺术.

As they say, if the only tool you have is a hammer, all problems begin to look like nails. My tool right now is philosophy, so I see little philosophical nails everywhere.